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A truthful double auction for two-sided heterogeneous mobile crowdsensing markets
Chen, Shuang1,2; Liu, Min1; Chen, Xiao1,2
2016-05-01
发表期刊COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS
ISSN0140-3664
卷号81页码:31-42
摘要Incentive mechanisms are critical for the success of mobile crowdsensing (MCS). Existing mechanisms mainly focus on scenarios where all sensing tasks are belong to a monopolistic campaign, while ignoring the situation where multiple campaigns coexist and compete for potential sensing capacities. In this paper, we study mechanisms in a two-sided heterogeneous MCS market with multiple requesters and users, where each requester publishes a sensing campaign consisting of various tasks whereas each user can undertake multiple tasks from one or more campaigns. The mechanism design in such a market is very challenging as the demands and supplies are extremely diverse. To fairly and effectively allocate resources and facilitate trades, we propose a novel truthful double auction mechanism named TDMC. By introducing a carefully designed virtual padding requester, a two-stage allocation approach and corresponding pricing schemes for both requesters and users are developed in TDMC. Through theoretical analysis, we prove that TDMC has the properties of truthfulness, individual rationality, budget balance, computational tractability, and asymptotic efficiency as the workload supply compared with demand becomes more and more sufficient. To make TDMC more adaptable, we further introduce two more flexible bid profiles for both requesters and users, and two adjustment methods to control the sensing quality. Extensive simulations demonstrate the effectiveness of TDMC. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
关键词Mobile crowdsensing Double auction Truthful mechanism Heterogeneous market
DOI10.1016/j.comcom.2015.11.010
收录类别SCI
语种英语
资助项目National Natural Science Foundation of China[61132001] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[61120106008] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[61472402] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[61472404] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[61272474] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[61202410] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[61502457] ; National Natural Science Foundation of China[61572476]
WOS研究方向Computer Science ; Engineering ; Telecommunications
WOS类目Computer Science, Information Systems ; Engineering, Electrical & Electronic ; Telecommunications
WOS记录号WOS:000374608600003
出版者ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
引用统计
被引频次:10[WOS]   [WOS记录]     [WOS相关记录]
文献类型期刊论文
条目标识符http://119.78.100.204/handle/2XEOYT63/8493
专题中国科学院计算技术研究所期刊论文_英文
通讯作者Liu, Min
作者单位1.Chinese Acad Sci, Inst Comp Technol, Beijing 100190, Peoples R China
2.Univ Chinese Acad Sci, Sch Comp & Control Engn, Beijing 100049, Peoples R China
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Chen, Shuang,Liu, Min,Chen, Xiao. A truthful double auction for two-sided heterogeneous mobile crowdsensing markets[J]. COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS,2016,81:31-42.
APA Chen, Shuang,Liu, Min,&Chen, Xiao.(2016).A truthful double auction for two-sided heterogeneous mobile crowdsensing markets.COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS,81,31-42.
MLA Chen, Shuang,et al."A truthful double auction for two-sided heterogeneous mobile crowdsensing markets".COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS 81(2016):31-42.
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