Optimal defense against election control by deleting voter groups

doi:10.1016/j.artint.2018.02.001

	Optimal defense against election control by deleting voter groups
	Yin, Yue 1; Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy 2; An, Bo 3; Hazon, Noam 4
	2018-06-01
发表期刊	ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
ISSN	0004-3702
卷号	259 页码:32-51
摘要	Election control encompasses attempts from an external agent to alter the structure of an election in order to change its outcome. This problem is both a fundamental theoretical problem in social choice, and a major practical concern for democratic institutions. Consequently, this issue has received considerable attention, particularly as it pertains to different voting rules. In contrast, the problem of how election control can be prevented or deterred has been largely ignored. We introduce the problem of optimal defense against election control, including destructive and constructive control, where manipulation is allowed at the granularity of groups of voters (e.g., voting locations) through a denial of-service attack, and the defender allocates limited protection resources to prevent control. We consider plurality voting, and show that it is computationally hard to prevent both types of control, though destructive control itself can be performed in polynomial time. For defense against destructive control, we present a double-oracle framework for computing an optimal prevention strategy. We show that both defender and attacker best response subproblems are NP-complete, and develop exact mixed-integer linear programming approaches for solving these, as well as fast heuristic methods. We then extend this general approach to develop effective algorithmic solutions for defense against constructive control. Finally, we generalize the model and algorithmic approaches to consider uncertainty about voter preferences. Experiments conducted on both synthetic and real data demonstrate that the proposed computational framework can scale to realistic problem instances.(1) (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
关键词	Election control Protecting elections Security games
DOI	10.1016/j.artint.2018.02.001
收录类别	SCI
语种	英语
资助项目	National Science Foundation[CNS-1238959] ; National Science Foundation[IIS-1526860] ; National Science Foundation[IIS-1649972] ; Office of Naval Research[N00014-15-1-2621] ; Army Research Office[W911NF-16-1-0069] ; AFRL[FA8750-14-2-0180] ; Israel Science Foundation[1488/14] ; [NRF2015NCR-NCR003-004]
WOS研究方向	Computer Science
WOS类目	Computer Science, Artificial Intelligence
WOS记录号	WOS:000432512700002
出版者	ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
引用统计	被引频次：9[WOS] [WOS记录] [WOS相关记录]
文献类型	期刊论文
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.204/handle/2XEOYT63/5283
专题	中国科学院计算技术研究所期刊论文_英文
通讯作者	Yin, Yue; Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy
作者单位	1.Univ Chinese Acad Sci, CAS, ICT, Key Lab Intelligent Informat Proc, Beijing, Peoples R China 2.Vanderbilt Univ, Elect Engn & Comp Sci, 221 Kirkland Hall, Nashville, TN 37235 USA 3.Nanyang Technol Univ, Sch Comp Sci & Engn, Singapore, Singapore 4.Ariel Univ, Dept Comp Sci, Ariel, Israel
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Yin, Yue,Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy,An, Bo,et al. Optimal defense against election control by deleting voter groups[J]. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE,2018,259:32-51.
APA	Yin, Yue,Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy,An, Bo,&Hazon, Noam.(2018).Optimal defense against election control by deleting voter groups.ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE,259,32-51.
MLA	Yin, Yue,et al."Optimal defense against election control by deleting voter groups".ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 259(2018):32-51.